



NO 759 / JUNE 2007
LINEAR-QUADRATIC 
APPROXIMATION, 
EXTERNAL HABIT AND 
TARGETING RULES
by Paul Levine, 
Joseph Pearlman
and Richard PierseIn 2007 all ECB 
publications 
feature a motif 
taken from the 
€20 banknote.
WORKING PAPER SERIES
NO 759 / JUNE 2007
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=989603.
1    We acknowledge financial support for this research from the ESRC, project no. RES-000-23-1126 and from the European Central 
Bank’s Research Visitors Programme for Paul Levine. Thanks are owing to the ECB for this hospitality and to numerous resident 
and visiting researchers for stimulating discussions. Views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB. An 
earlier version of this paper was presented at the 12th conference on Computing in Economics and Finance in Limassol, Cyprus, 
June 22-24, 2006; at the 4th Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis Conference, University of St Andrews, Sept 6-8, 2006 
and at seminars at the Bank of England and the University of Surrey. We have benefited from comments of participants at all 
2    Department of Economics, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom; e-mail: P.Levine@surrey.ac.uk
3    London Metropolitan University, 31 Jewry Street, London, EC3N 2EY, United Kingdom; e-mail: j.pearlman@londonmet.ac.uk
4    Department of Economics, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom; e-mail: R.Pierse@surrey.ac.uk
LINEAR-QUADRATIC 
APPROXIMATION, 
EXTERNAL HABIT AND 
TARGETING RULES 1
by Paul Levine 2, 
Joseph Pearlman 3
and Richard Pierse 4
these events and from an anonymous referee, and from further discussions with Jinill Kim.© European Central Bank, 2007
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone 




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Any reproduction, publication and 
reprint in the form of a different 
publication, whether printed or 
produced electronically, in whole or in 
part, is permitted only with the explicit 
written authorisation of the ECB or the 
author(s).
The views expressed in this paper do not 
necessarily reflect those of the European 
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB 
Working Paper Series is available from 




Working Paper Series No 759 
June 2007
CONTENTS
Abstract   4
Non-Technical Summary  5
1   Introduction   7
2     The LQ approximation to a general dynamic 
optimization problem   9
  2.1    Necessary and sufficient conditions for 
9
  2.2    A simple example  13
15
  3.1    Characterization of the efficient level  15
  3.2    The flexible-price solution and the 
Ramsey problem  16
  3.3    LQ approximation of the Ramsey 
problem: efficient case  17
  3.4  The small distortion case  19
4     LQ approximation of optimal monetary 
policy in a DSGE model   20
  4.1  Price dispersion and the costs of inflation  22
  4.2  The Ramsey problem  23
  4.3  Linearization of dynamics  25
  4.4  The accurate LQ approximation  25
  4.5  Summary of the general procedure  26
  4.6  The social planner’s problem   27
  4.7  The efficient case  28
  4.8  The small distortion case  29
5   Target implementability and external habit   29
6   Nash equilibria in a two-bloc model   32
  6.1  Non-cooperative social planners’ problem  32
  6.2    Choice of subsidy to match the 
efficient level  33
  6.3    LQ approximation for the small 
distortions case   33
  6.4    LQ approximation for the large 
distortions case   35
7   Concluding remarks   38
A     The equivalence of the Benigno-Woodford 
and Hamiltonian procedures   39
  A.1  The Benigno-Woodford procedure  39
  A.2  The Hamiltonian procedure  40
B   Proof of proposition   40
C     Derivation of second-order welfare 
41
References   42
European Central Bank Working Paper Series  44
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an accurate LQ approximation 
3   The social planner’s and Ramsey problems  Abstract
We examine the linear-quadratic (LQ) approximation of non-linear stochastic dy-
namic optimization problems in macroeconomics, in particular for monetary policy.
We make four main contributions: ﬁrst, we draw attention to a general Hamiltonian
framework for LQ approximation due to Magill (1977). We show that the procedure for
the ‘large distortions’ case of Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005) is equivalent to the
Hamiltonian approach, but the latter is far easier to implement. Second, we apply the
Hamiltonian approach to a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with exter-
nal habit in consumption. Third, we introduce the concept of target-implementability
which ﬁts in with the general notion of targeting rules proposed by Svensson (2003,
2005). We derive suﬃcient conditions for the LQ approximation to have this property
in the vicinity of a zero-inﬂation steady state. Finally, we extend the Hamiltonian
approach to a non-cooperative equilibrium in a two-country model.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E37, E58
Keywords: Linear-quadratic approximation, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models, utility-based loss function.
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This paper is about macroeconomic optimization problems in general with a particular
application to welfare-optimal monetary policy. The title may sound like a smorgasbord
of disparate topics, but in fact, as we will demonstrate, the correct linear-quadratic (LQ)
approximation of a non-linear optimization problem, external habit in New Keynesian
models and the idea of general targeting monetary rules in the literature by are all closely
related.
LQ approximations to non-linear dynamic optimization problems in macroeconomics
are widely used for a number of reasons. First, for LQ problems the characterization of
time consistent and commitment equilibria for a single policy maker, and even more so for
many interacting policymakers, are well-understood, and inexpensive to compute. Indeed
the ‘curse of dimensionality’ will ensure the usefulness of LQ approximations to many of
these problem, even for the case of a single policy-maker. Second, the ‘certainty equiva-
lence’ property results in optimal rules that robust in the sense that they are independent
of the properties of the additive disturbances. Third, policy can be decomposed into an
average (deterministic) and a stochastic, stabilization component that prescribes how the
instrument should respond to unanticipated shocks. This is a very convenient property
since it enables the stabilization component to be pursued using simple Taylor-type feed-
back rules rather than the exceedingly complex optimal counterpart. Fourth, the stability
of the system is conveniently summarized in terms of the eigenvalues of the system with
the policy rule in place. Finally for suﬃciently simple models, LQ approximation allows
analytical rather than numerical solution.
But what is the correct procedure for replacing a stochastic, non-linear optimization
problem with a LQ approximation? We make four main contributions to the optimal
macroeconomic policy literature. First, we draw attention to a general Hamiltonian frame-
work for approximating a non-linear problem by an LQ one due to Magill (1977), who
appears to be the ﬁrst to have applied it in the economics literature. We use a simple
example to show that the procedure for the ‘large distortions’ case of Benigno and Wood-
ford (2003, 2005) is equivalent to the Hamiltonian approach, but the latter is far easier to
implement. Second, we apply the Hamiltonian approach to a fairly standard New Keyne-
sian model with external habit in consumption. We show that in such a model the natural
rate of output can exceed the eﬃcient rate if habit is suﬃciently strong and this feature
has important implications for the form of the LQ approximation. Third, we introduce
the concept of ‘target-implementability’ which requires the quadratic approximation of
the welfare to be expressed in terms of targets or ‘bliss points’ for linear combinations
of macroeconomic variables. Such a property ﬁts in with the notion of targeting rules
proposed in the literature. We then derive suﬃcient conditions for the LQ approximation
to have this property in the vicinity of a zero-inﬂation steady state. Finally we extend the
Hamiltonian approach to a non-cooperative equilibrium in a two-country model.
5
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utility function given a linearized model economy in the vicinity of the Ramsey commitment
problem for the policymaker. For the case of non-cooperative games, the latter is the
Ramsey problem for each policy-maker given the trajectory of instruments of the other
players. The question then is, given the choice of welfare which diﬀers for cooperative and
non-cooperative games, is this LQ approximation appropriate for other types of policy (for
example for optimized simple rules, time-consistent policy or for other non-cooperative
equilibrium concepts)? Because the Ramsey commitment problem is, ex ante, the best
the policymaker can achieve this is indeed the case. Thus LQ approximation provides a
tractable framework for comparing both cooperative and non-cooperative rules with and
without commitment, and diﬀerent forms of non-cooperative equilibria using the same
LQ approximation of the problem facing each policymaker. Future research involving the
authors will pursue precisely this agenda.
6
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This paper is about macroeconomic optimization problems in general with a particular
application to welfare-optimal monetary policy. The title may sound like a smorgasbord
of disparate topics, but in fact, as we will demonstrate, the correct linear-quadratic (LQ)
approximation of a non-linear optimization problem, external habit in DSGE models and
the idea of general targeting monetary rules as proposed by Svensson(2003, 2005) are all
related.
LQ approximations to non-linear dynamic optimization problems in macroeconomics
are widely used for a number of reasons. First, for LQ problems the characterization of
time consistent and commitment equilibria for a single policy maker, and even more so
for many interacting policymakers, are well-understood. Second, the certainty equiva-
lence property results in optimal rules that robust in the sense that they are independent
of the variance-covariance matrix of additive disturbances. Third, policy can be decom-
posed into deterministic and stochastic components. This is a very convenient property
since it enables the stochastic stabilization component to be pursued using simple Taylor-
type feedback rules rather than the exceedingly complex optimal counterpart. Fourth,
the stability of the system is conveniently summarized in terms of eigenvalues. Finally
for suﬃciently simple models, LQ approximation allows analytical rather than numerical
solution.
But what is the correct procedure for replacing a stochastic non-linear optimization
problem with a LQ approximation? Until quite recently some common methods employed
by economists have produced poor approximations which open up the possibility of spu-
rious results. These pitfalls are very neatly exposed in Kim and Kim (2003) and Kim and
Kim (2006).
We make four main contributions to the optimal macroeconomic policy literature.
First, we draw attention to a general Hamiltonian framework for approximating a non-
linear problem by an LQ one due to Magill (1977), who appears to be the ﬁrst to have
applied it in the economics literature. We use a simple example to show that the proce-
dure for the ‘large distortions’ case of Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005) is equivalent
to the Hamiltonian approach, but the latter is far easier to implement.1 Second, we ap-
ply the Hamiltonian approach to a fairly standard New Keynesian DSGE model with
external habit in consumption. We show that in such a model the natural rate of output
can exceed the eﬃcient rate if habit is suﬃciently strong and this feature has important
implications for the form of the LQ approximation. Third, we introduce the concept of
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expressed in terms of targets or ‘bliss points’ for linear combinations of macroeconomic
variables. Such a property ﬁts in with the notion of targeting rules proposed by Svensson
(2003, 2005). We then derive suﬃcient conditions for the LQ approximation to have this
property in the vicinity of a zero-inﬂation steady state. Finally we extend the Hamilto-
nian approach to a non-cooperative equilibrium in a two-country model. In the simple
model of Clarida et al. (2002) without habit in consumption, we show that the commonly
used procedures for LQ approximation assuming either an eﬃcient zero-inﬂation steady
state (achieved by a subsidy) or ‘small distortions’ are inappropriate unless the instru-
ment in the Nash equilibrium is assumed to be output. If, perhaps more plausibly, the
instrument is taken to be inﬂation (or inﬂation targets perfectly achieved) then the Hamil-
tonian approach, which we extend to the two-country non-cooperative equilibrium, must
be employed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the results of a
discrete-time version of the continuous-time results of and Magill (1977). We provide a
simple example of this, using a simple New Keynesian model and ad hoc policymaker’s
utility function as set out in Clarida et al. (1999) and demonstrate that for this simple
example the BW and Hamiltonian procedures are equivalent.
In Section 3 we introduce the general class of DSGE models to be studied. We examine
the social planner’s problem where optimization is only subject to resource constraints. We
then proceed to the Ramsey problem where, in addition, the policy-maker faces constraints
in the form of decentralized decisions by households and ﬁrms, given the instrument at
her disposal. The LQ approximation to the Ramsey problem is analyzed for the ‘eﬃcient
case’ (where subsidies eliminate distortions in the steady state) and the ‘small distortions
case’ where such subsidies are not available.
Section 4 applies the general results of preceding sections to welfare-maximizing mon-
etary policy in a fairly standard New Keynesian framework, with external habit in con-
sumption. We derive the corresponding LQ approximation to the policymaker’s problem,
and brieﬂy comment on its representation when there is no habit. In addition we compare
the quadratic expansions in the eﬃcient case and the large distortions case.
Section 5 deﬁnes and discusses the notion of target-implementability; this is essentially
about the conduction of monetary policy by the setting of targets in the loss function
by the monetary authority, as advocated by Svensson, when it engages in stabilization
policy. We then obtain suﬃcient conditions for the target implementability of the LQ
approximation to the Ramsey problem in the vicinity of a zero-inﬂation steady state.
Finally, to demonstrate that second-order conditions for a maximum do matter, we provide
8
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are not satisﬁed although the zero-inﬂation steady state satisﬁes the necessary ﬁrst-order
conditions.
In Section 6, we extend our work to the two bloc case. We demonstrate the inadequacy
of the ‘small distortions’ approach, and derive an appropriate LQ approximation for the
‘large distortions’ case, which we compare with Benigno and Benigno (2006). Section 7
provides some concluding remarks.
2 The LQ Approximation to a General Dynamic Optimiza-
tion Problem
In this section we provide the mathematical background to LQ approximations that pro-
vide accurate ﬁrst-order approximations to deviations from the optimal solution to a
deterministic dynamic optimization (or optimal control) problem. We ﬁrstly state the
requirements for an LQ approximation to be accurate to ﬁrst order, and then explain
how it may be obtained using the Lagrangian of the problem. We apply this to a very
simple economic model with a rudimentary output/inﬂation tradeoﬀ. The reason for so
doing is to demonstrate that the method of Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005) as used
in this model is equivalent to implementing a Lagrangian (or more strictly a Hamiltonian)
approach to the objective function.
2.1 Necessary and Suﬃcient Conditions for an Accurate LQ Approxi-
mation:




βtU(Xt−1,Wt) s.t. Xt = f(Xt−1,Wt) (1)
given initial and possibly tranversality conditions, which has a steady state solution ¯ X, ¯ W
for the states Xt and the policies Wt. Deﬁne xt = Xt− ¯ X and wt = Wt− ¯ W as representing
2An alternative representation of the problem is U(Xt,Wt) and Et[Xt+1] = f(Xt,Wt) where Xt includes
forward-looking non-predetermined variables and Et[Xt+1] = Xt+1 for the deterministic problem where
perfect foresight applies. Whichever one uses, it is easy to switch from one to the other by a simple re-
deﬁnition. Magill (1977) adopted a continuous-time model without forward-looking variables. We present
a discrete-time version with forward-looking variables. As we demonstrate in the paper, although the
inclusion of forward-looking variables signiﬁcantly alters the nature of the optimization problem, these
changes only aﬀect the boundary conditions and not the steady state of the optimum which is all we
require for LQ approximation.
9
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 759 
June 2007the ﬁrst-order approximation to deviations of states and policies from their steady states.























s.t. xt = Axt−1 + Bwt + c
(2)
Then a necessary condition for this to be a ﬁrst-order accurate solution is that b = 0, c = 0
i.e. the objective function must be purely quadratic and the dynamics purely linear in
deviations. The reasons for this are clear; ﬁrstly, suppose that the system starts in the
steady state; it could only remain in the steady state xt = 0, wt = 0 if c = 0. Secondly, if
b  = 0 then there is a bliss-point Q−1b  = 0 which would be desirable, so that the solution
to the problem starting at the steady state would not remain at the steady state.
The implications of these conditions are rather serious given the manner in which many
LQ approximations were conducted within the economics profession up until a few years
ago. Often, the approach used would often not even involve ﬁnding the steady state of the
optimal solution to the problem. Even were that the case, the next error to be committed
would be to use merely a Taylor series approximation to the objective function f(X, W),
whose ﬁrst-order expansion cannot of course be guaranteed to equal zero.
However there exists a very straightforward approach to ﬁnding the appropriate ap-





t (Xt − f(Xt−1,Wt))] (3)
so that a necessary condition for the solution to (1) is that the Lagrangian is stationary
at all {Xs}, {Ws} i.e.
UW + λT





t fX = 0 (4)
These necessary conditions for an optimum do not imply that the there is an asymp-
totic steady state to (4). However for the purposes of this paper, let us assume that this
is the case, so that a steady state ¯ λ for the Lagrange multipliers exists as well. Now deﬁne
the Hamiltonian Ht = U(Xt−1,Wt) + ¯ λTf(Xt−1,Wt). The following is the discrete time
version of Magill (1977):
Theorem 1: If a steady state solution ( ¯ X, ¯ W, ¯ λ) to the optimization problem (1) exists,

















s.t. xt = fXxt−1 + fWwt (5)
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where HXX, etc denote second-order derivatives evaluated at ( ¯ X, ¯ W).3The reason why this result holds is because the derivatives of the Lagrangian with re-





t=0 βt[U(Xt−1,Wt) − ¯ λT(Xt − f(Xt−1,Wt))], and the ﬁrst-order term of the Taylor
series expansion of the latter expression is zero.
For the result of theorem to hold ( ¯ X, ¯ W, ¯ λ) must satisfy (4). These, it should be
stressed, are necessary but not suﬃcient conditions for a local maximum. A standard suf-
ﬁcient condition for optimality is that the functions f(X,W) and U(X,W) are concave,
but this is rarely satisﬁed in examples from economics. A more useful suﬃcient condition
is the following:
Theorem 2: A suﬃcient condition for for the steady state of (4) to be a local maxi-
mum is that the matrix of second derivatives of H in (5) is negative semi-deﬁnite4.
This condition is easy to check, but in the event that it does not hold, the following
discrete time version of the suﬃcient conditions for an optimum Magill (1977) is applicable
when the constraints and/or the welfare function are non-concave. It is based on iterating
the quadratic approximation to the value function.
Theorem 3:
(a) A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the solution (4) to the dynamic optimization
problem (1) to be a local maximum is that βfT
WPtfW + HWW is negative deﬁnite for all
t, where the matrices fX,fW,HXX,HXW,HWW are all evaluated along the solution path





WPtfX + HWX)+ HXX
(6)
3Benigno and Woodford (2006), in their quadratiﬁcation of the Lagrangian, emphasise the ’timeless
perspective’ which imposes initial conditions on the ex ante optimal rule that ensures a consistency (though
not Kydland-Prescott ’time consistency’) in the form of commitment. This policy is then used as a
benchmark in the relative evaluation of other policy rules. However, it is easy to see that there is no
essential diﬀerence between (5), or more precisely (8) below, and their (2.21); this is because under the
timeless perspective the deviations are evaluated, as is the case here, about the steady state of the optimum.
The only diﬀerence arises from their presentation of the dynamic constraints; we have re-arranged the latter
so that the most forward-dated variables appear on the LHS of the constraint.
4A simple example of a problem for which a maximum exists, but for which this suﬃcient condition
does not hold is: max x
2−y
2 such that y = ax+b. It is easy to see that the stationary point is a maximum
when |a| > 1.
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dynamic optimization problem is given by 1
2xT
t Ptxt.
(b) Consider a rational expectations system, where we order Xt as predetermined
followed by non-predetermined variables, so that the latter dynamic constraints involve
forward-looking expectations. Suppose that there is a long-run steady state solution to
the ﬁrst-order conditions. Then a further necessary and suﬃcient condition for this to
be a maximum is that the bottom right-hand corner P22 of the the steady-state Riccati
matrix P is negative deﬁnite. 5
Proof: The basic idea is that the the optimal policy depends on the initial condition and
the instruments and, in the case of an RE system, the jumps in the non-predetermined
variables. Given the latter, one can take a dynamic programming approach to the problem
to prove (a): taking variations about the optimal path, one may write the value function
Vt at time t as a constant plus 1
2xT



















with respect to wt. The stated conditions for a maximum, and the update of Pt are
straightforward to derive from this.
To prove (b), recall that from Currie and Levine (1993), we have the result under
RE that V0 is given by 1
2(x
pT





22 p0) where x
p
t are the devia-
tions in the predetermined variables, p0 is the initial value of the Lagrange multipliers
5This turns out to be almost the same result as in Benigno and Woodford (2006); their Lemma 2(i) is a
frequency domain requirement which in our case corresponds to the negative deﬁniteness of the steady state
of P. However this result is only true for certain special cases, see Trentelman and Rapisarda (2001), which
discusses the continuous time Riccati equation, but brieﬂy refers to the discrete time version as well; the
result is not necessarily valid when, for example, quadratic costs on the policy variables are neither negative
nor positive deﬁnite. Their Lemma 2(ii) when rephrased in terms of our setup relates directly to the
representation of the welfare in terms of (a) deviations in the backward-looking variable, plus (b) deviations
in the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the forward-looking variable, and in addition (c) a quadratic
term in the instrument, where the latter depends on the negative deﬁniteness of βf
T
WPfW + HWW. The
quadratic weighting on (a) is P11 − P12P
−1
22 P21, and on (b) is P
−1
22 , where these are deﬁned in the proof
of the theorem. These are each required by their Lemma 2(ii) to be negative deﬁnite, and it is easy to
show that this is equivalent to P being negative deﬁnite. Thus their Lemma 2(i) is redundant. However
the requirement on the backward-looking variables is not a necessary condition for optimality, so there is
a further redundancy. Their interpretation of of non-negative deﬁniteness of P
−1
22 is diﬀerent from ours
because of the focus on the timeless perspective. Because this does not allow for unbounded initial values
of the Lagrange multiplier p0 (see proof), they show instead that that it could lead to random policies that
perform better than the deterministic ones.
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is written conformably with predetermined and
non-predetermined variables respectively. Clearly if P−1
22 is not non-negative deﬁnite, then
the value of V0 can be set arbitrarily large by appropriate choice of p0; in such a case, a
solution to the problem which tends to a steady state optimum does not exist.
As mentioned above we assume the existence of a steady state solution to (4) given by
[ ¯ X, ¯ W, ¯ λ], since we are interested in approximations about the latter. Hence the matrices
in (6) (apart from Pt) are constant. Thus this theorem provides a means of checking
whether a candidate solution to (4) actually is optimal. Note that the perturbed system
is in standard linear-quadratic format, which is the basis for this result.
We also note that Magill (1977)’s result easily extends to the stochastic case as well.
Thus if the dynamic equations are written as Xt = f(Xt−1,Wt,εt), where the εt have
mean zero and are independently normally distributed then any perturbations about the


























s.t. xt = fXxt−1 + fWwt + fεεt (8)
2.2 A Simple Example
We now present an application of this theorem to a simple stylized problem, which also
summarizes the erroneous approach to LQ approximation. In addition, we outline how
the method of Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005) would be implemented to ﬁnd the LQ
approximation. The two methods are equivalent, but the Hamiltonian approach is both
more general and more straightforward to implement.
Consider the following optimization problem for a monetary authority to choose a












where xt is the output gap in logarithms given by a non-linear ‘New Keynesian’ Phillips
curve
πt = βEtπt+1 + f(xt) + st ; f′ > 0, f′′ < 0 (10)
13
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f(xn) = 0. Then in (9) x∗ ≥ xn is the logarithm of the eﬃcient level of output where
ineﬃciency arises from monopolistic competition in the output market.
A common procedure for reducing this to a LQ problem is to expand about the steady
state xn so that f(xt) ≃ f(xn)+f′(xn)(xt−xn)+ 1
2f′′(x)(xt−xn)2=a(xt−xn)−b(xt−xn)2.
Much of the literature6 including Clarida et al. (1999) then erroneously adopts a linearized
Phillips curve
πt = βEtπt+1 + a(xt − xn) + st (11)
and proceeds with the LQ problem of minimizing (9) subject to (11). The error arises
from the objective function including a linear term in xtx∗. From (10), xt = f−1(πt −
βEtπt+1 − ut) so unless x∗ is small, there is a second-order term missing in the objective
function if one proceeds with the linear approximation (11).
To get round this problem, the procedure set out in BW considers the deterministic
problem with commitment, so that there is no need to distinguish between Etπt+1 and
πt+1. Then one selects a new steady state (¯ π, ¯ x) satisfying (10), and a multiplier h and
weights θ, φ such that
∞  
t=0




t +h[β(πt+1−¯ π)−(πt−¯ π)+f(xt)−f(¯ x)]]
(12)
up to a second order approximation in deviations about the steady state, give or take
constant terms. Then the problem becomes that of minimizing (12) subject to
πt − ¯ π = βEt(πt+1 − ¯ π) − f(xt) + f(¯ x) + ut ∼ = βEt(πt+1 − ¯ π) + a(xt − ¯ x) + ut (13)
The BW procedure then amounts to ﬁnding the values ¯ π, ¯ x,θ,φ and h which are consistent
with the equalities in (12) and (13). For this simple example it is obvious that φ = 1.
Using the Hamiltonian approach it is more straightforward to show that ¯ π, ¯ x, h and θ
are given by






= 0 (1−β)¯ π−f(¯ x) = 0 θ = 1+hb (14)
Details are provided in Appendix A. By either method we can now see exactly what is
wrong with minimizing (9) subject to (11). Suppose that the policymaker adopts the
same discount factor as the private sector, then λ = β and ¯ π = 0; that is the steady state
is the same deterministic non-inﬂationary steady state x, where f(x) = 0, we chose for
(11). Then comparing the BW procedure with the standard LQ approximation discussed
6Some previous work of one of the authors joins a distinguished list (see Currie and Levine (1993)).
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(x∗ − ¯ x) or b are small. In the former case this implies that the output target is close to
the non-inﬂationary stated state of xt, whilst in the latter case the Phillips curve is nearly
linear. If neither of these conditions apply then the BW or Hamiltonian procedures must
be used.
3 The Social Planner’s and Ramsey Problems
In this section we introduce the class of DSGE models to be studied. We assume a set of
consumers, each with given endowments, whose objective is to maximize an intertemporal
utility function. Typically this will incorporate consumption and leisure, but we shall
state the objectives in a general fashion, so that they can incorporate habit as well. Thus





where the vector Wit represents individual i’s choices e.g. consumption and labour supply.
This utility function may also incorporate habit or catching-up, and may therefore also
be dependent on aggregate or average choices made in the previous period Wt−1.
We also assume that any resource constraints sum to a set of aggregate resource con-
straints. One can then deﬁne the social planner’s problem in terms of the representative




βtU(Xt−1,Wt) s.t. Xt = f(Xt−1,Wt,εt) (16)
where the set of constraints in this problem represent the set of (possibly intertemporal)
resource constraints and exogenous processes describing the environment. These might
include a dynamic equation for capital accumulation, and also capital utilization as in
Smets and Wouters (2003).7
3.1 Characterization of the Eﬃcient Level
Ultimately we are going to approximate the non-linear stochastic optimization problem
in the vicinity of a suitably chosen deterministic steady state. We therefore focus on the
7Although there appear to be signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the functions u of (15) and U of (16), these





represents the resource constraints, and X2t = Wt, then the presence of Xt−1 in U is merely a generalization
of including Wt−1 in U.
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t (Xt − f(Xt−1,Wt))] (17)
the following ﬁrst order conditions provide the necessary conditions for the solution:
UW(Xt−1,Wt)+λT







The steady state of the deterministic social planner’s problem, the eﬃcient level (denoted
by ∗), is then given by
X∗ = f(X∗,W∗) UW(X∗,W∗) + λ∗TfW(X∗,W∗) = 0
UX(X∗,W∗) + λ∗TfX(X∗,W∗) − 1
βλ∗T = 0 (19)
3.2 The Flexible-Price Solution and the Ramsey Problem
The diﬀerence between the eﬃcient solution and that of the competitive or ﬂexible-price
solution is due to the externalities of habit and of ﬁrm and labour market power. As we
shall see below for a particular example, the externality due to consumption habit works in
the opposite direction to the externalities that produce the mark-ups in prices and wages.
In principle it is possible to set a proportional tax (or subsidy) in the ﬂexible-price case
that yields a ‘natural’ level of output exactly equal to the eﬃcient level of output of the
social planner.
Thus typically in economic models of this type we would assume monopolistic com-
petition by ﬁrms. This leads to mark-up pricing, and creates a wedge between the level
of output under competition - the natural rate - and the level of output that could be
achieved by a social planner - the eﬃcient level. This wedge may be exacerbated if we as-
sume that there is labour market power as well. The latter is not incorporated by Benigno
and Woodford (2005), but is common in most other New Keynesian models e.g. Clarida
et al. (2002). We also assume that costs for ﬁrms are continuous, which rules out state-
dependent S − s policies; we do this because such policies cannot be easily aggregated.
Initially we ignore the stochastic problem because the deterministic problem is suﬃcient
to set up the LQ approximation.
Thus far we have only discussed the eﬃcient and ﬂexible-price levels of output. A more
general model takes into account the fact that neither wages nor prices are completely
ﬂexible. As a consequence, we must discuss the case where a policymaker is required to
maximize average welfare, in this case by choosing the optimal path for inﬂation. This is
a particular case of the Ramsey problem.
16
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planner’s problem in that there is decentralized decision-making that has to be taken into
account by the Ramsey planner. One can incorporate this in a general way into the model
by expanding the state space to take account of the additional dynamic behaviour of the
system. From the point of view of the Ramsey policymaker, the problem must be rewritten




In the New Keynesian model that we study below, the only diﬀerence between the
functions U and V is that there is an eﬀect of price dispersion, where the latter is one of
the components of the new set of variables Zt. Price dispersion aﬀects the disutility of
labour. We assume that the decentralized decisions can somehow be aggregated, so that
the constraints that must be satisﬁed by the Ramsey policymaker constitute both the
resource constraints and the additional implementation constraints8 (typically associated
with price and wage-setting, but excluding the intertemporal wealth constraint):
Xt = f(Xt−1,Wt) Zt = g(Zt−1,Xt−1,Wt;τ) (21)
It is important to appreciate that the implementation constraints associated with Zt rep-
resent individuals’ and ﬁrms’ decisions, and may involve future expectations. We take
the approach that the Ramsey policymaker has a reputation for precommitment, so that
we can take expectations of the future as always being fulﬁlled, and therefore regard all
equations as backward looking. Suppose in addition that all factor prices are ﬁxed so
that inﬂation is 0 i.e. the appropriate elements of the vector Z are set equal to 0; we
then obtain a solution to the ‘natural’ rate by solving for the steady state ¯ X = f( ¯ X, ¯ W),
¯ Z = g( ¯ Z, ¯ X, ¯ W;τ). This is also known as the ﬂexible price equilibrium. An important
consideration is that the natural rate will be dependent on the tax/subsidy rate τ.
3.3 LQ Approximation of the Ramsey Problem: Eﬃcient Case
Woodford (2003) now points out a key result for LQ-approximation. If at all possible,
the aim of the Ramsey policymaker is to stabilize the economy about the eﬃcient level of
output. Let us assume therefore that the proportional tax/subsidy is set at exactly the
level at which the ﬂexible price equilibrium achieves the eﬃcient level of output. This
implies that there exists a value τ∗ such that the eﬃcient rate, coupled with zero inﬂation,
is a solution to Z∗ = g(X∗,Z∗,W∗;τ∗).
8This terminology is now widely used e.g. Khan et al. (2003), Kim et al. (2006b).
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function about the steady steady state eﬃcient solution without the presence of linear
terms and (b) to expand the constraints about the steady state eﬃcient solution without
the presence of constant terms.
Theorem 4:
The stabilization problem for the Ramsey policymaker can be approximately expressed
as a quadratic expansion of the welfare function about the eﬃcient level, provided that
the Taylor series of ˜ V = V (Xt−1,Zt−1,Wt) − U(Xt−1,Wt) about the eﬃcient level has no
ﬁrst-order terms.
Proof: We ﬁrst deal with the utility function, using the notation for deviations from

























βt[U(X∗,W∗) + (UX −
1
β







t HWWwt + ˜ V (Xt−1,Zt−1,Wt)] (22)
where H = U(X,W)+λ∗Tf(X,W), and its second derivatives are evaluated at(X∗,W∗).
Hence, using (19), the linear terms in xt,wt vanish. Since by assumption there are no
ﬁrst-order terms in the expansion of ˜ V at the eﬃcient level, it follows that this expansion
has no ﬁrst-order terms present.
Now consider the constraints. Firstly the resource constraint is in steady state at the
eﬃcient level, so that an expansion about the latter will contain no constant term. Sec-
ondly, the constraint involving Z, by appropriate choice of τ = τ∗ is also in a zero-inﬂation
steady state at the eﬃcient level, so that any approximation of its dynamics about the
eﬃcient level will omit a constant term. This completes the proof.
The implication of this proof is that the welfare function cannot always be approximated
as a constant plus quadratic terms, centred on the eﬃcient rate, once the resource con-
straints have been incorporated. There are two conditions that must be satisﬁed for this
18
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ondly the implementation constraints must incorporate a tax/subsidy rate such that their
steady-state solution is characterized by zero inﬂation and the eﬃcient level of output.
If the tax/subsidy rate is inconsistent with the above, then there is a distortion relative
to the eﬃcient case, and it is then necessary to assess whether this is a large or a small
distortion.
3.4 The Small Distortion Case
Suppose that the tax/subsidy is insuﬃcient to eliminate the ineﬃciency, but that the
latter is small. There are then two approaches to obtain an approximation to the LQ
approximation. The ﬁrst is take deviations about the ineﬃcient steady state. This will,
as we have seen above, produce an approximation to the welfare that contains a constant
term (the steady-state welfare in the eﬃcient case), and a quadratic term. The error in
the approximation is then in the dynamic equation describing individual decisions. In this
case, the eﬃcient level Z∗ is not consistent with the steady state because τ  = τ∗, which
means that the linearized approximation of the dynamic equation in for Zt will contain a
term Z∗ − g(X∗,Z∗,W∗;τ); if this is small, it may be ignored.
The alternative is to take deviations about the natural rate, as done by Woodford
(2003), Appendix E. Deﬁne the non-zero inﬂation natural rate as ( ¯ X, ¯ Z, ¯ W), which will
be dependent on τ. The dynamic equations in deviation form then no longer contain a
constant, but the linear terms in the welfare approximation (22) are now of the form:
(UX( ¯ X, ¯ W) −
1
β
λ∗T + λ∗TfX( ¯ X, ¯ W))xt−1 + (UW( ¯ X, ¯ W) + λ∗TfW( ¯ X, ¯ W))wt
∼ = (HX + ( ¯ X − X∗)THXX + ( ¯ W − W∗)THWX)xt−1
+(HW + ( ¯ X − X∗)THXW + ( ¯ W − W∗)THWW)wt
= (( ¯ X − X∗)THXX + ( ¯ W − W∗)THWX)xt−1
+(( ¯ X − X∗)THXW + ( ¯ W − W∗)THWW)wt (23)
Thus the linear terms can be ignored provided that ¯ X − X∗ and ¯ W − W∗ are small.
To summarize then, there are two ways of assessing whether ’small distortions’ are
indeed small, and which relate directly to the necessary conditions examined in Section
2. This is done either by (1) evaluating the eﬀect on the constant in the aggregated
decentralized equations or (2) the eﬀect on the ﬁrst-order terms in the Hamiltonian. A
further method of assessing the limitations of the small distortion case is discussed in
the next section, by comparing the weights on the quadratic terms of the LQ welfare
approximation for the eﬃcient and the non-eﬃcient case. This provides an arguably more
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the impact of the errors described above.
4 LQ Approximation of Optimal Monetary Policy in a DSGE
Model
We now turn to the main model of the paper and to optimal monetary policy. We initially
investigate the large distortions approximation and towards the end of this section, we
study both the eﬃcient and the small distortions case.
The standard New Keynesian model ascribes a ﬁxed probability in each period of
changing prices (and wages). This leads to dynamic equations for the overall price index,
and in turn this leads in the Woodford (2003) case to diﬀerent choices of labour supply
by individuals, and in the Clarida et al. (2002) case to each individual providing the same
quantity of labour. In the former, the policymaker takes the average of the utility function,
which for small variance of shocks is approximately the same as ﬂexible-price level of the
utility function, but with an additional eﬀect from the spread of prices. In the latter,
although labour supply is the same for each worker, it is dependent on the spread of
demand for each good; this in turn leads to the utility function diﬀering from the ﬂexible
price utility function by a term dependent on the spread of prices and wages.
The model is of a cashless economy with external habit in consumption. Consumers of
type i maximize the intemporal trade-oﬀ between consumption Cit - taking into account
a desire to consume at a level similar to that of last period’s average consumption Ct−1 -
and leisure. The latter is accounted for by penalising working time Nit.
Unlike Clarida et al. (2000) we do not incorporate a proportional tax (or subsidy)
into the model in order to ensure that the steady state, or natural rate, of output is at
the eﬃcient level. Instead we use the methodology of Section 2 to obtain a quadratic
approximation to the welfare when the natural rate diﬀers from the eﬃcient rate. This
is an issue also addressed by Benigno and Woodford (2005) using the less direct methods
outlined in the example of Section 2.
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it(Cit − hCCt−1)σ (26)
where Dt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor on holdings of one-period bonds, and the





All consumers can trade in a complete set of state contingent bonds, and therefore engage
in complete risk-sharing, so that (25) represents the Keynes-Ramsey intertemporal ﬁrst-
order condition for consumption across all consumers, taking habit into account. Equation
(26) equates relative marginal utilities of consumption and leisure to the real wage. Wit,Pt
are measures of the nominal wage of the ith agent and of price respectively. (26) also
incorporates market power of individual consumers, who are all distinct from the point of












it . Aggregate output Yt is similarly
deﬁned by aggregating over all labour inputs.
There is market-clearing in wages, and in this set-up all agents set the same wage and
work the same number of hours. Thus (26) holds when i is deleted, so for this setup there
is no need to aggregate Wt,Nt.
Firms:
Unlike workers, ﬁrms only reset prices in any given period with probability 1 − ξ. Thus
the optimal price P0
t for any ﬁrm that sets its price at t must take into account any future
periods during which the price remains unchanged.9
The ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt-maximization for the jth ﬁrm over the duration of
the optimal price not being reset takes into account the elasticity of substitution ζ between












9It is easy to show that if there is planned indexation to the overall price index as well i.e. the future
price at time t + k is given by P
0
t (Pt+k−1/Pt)
γ then all the results presented here are the same when Πt
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AtPt and the stochastic








The ﬁrst-order condition (29) is cumbersome to manipulate. However it is possible
to express this price-setting rule in terms of diﬀerence equations that are far easier to








and multiplying both sides of (29) by (
P 0
t
Pt )ζ(Ct − hCCt−1)−σ and in addition noting that
Pt+k/Pt = Πt+k...Πt+1, the ﬁrms’ staggered price setting can be succinctly described by
Qt = Λt/Ht (32)














Price index inﬂation given by
1 = ξΠ
ζ−1
t + (1 − ξ)Q
1−ζ
t (36)
The production function at the ﬁrm level is deﬁned as
Yt(j) = AtNt(j) (37)
where At represents a common technology shock and Nt(j) is an aggregate of diﬀerentiated
labour chosen by ﬁrm j. Then aggregate output across ﬁrms, some of whom can re-
optimize prices at time t, is given by Yt = At
 
j Nt(j) = AtNt.
4.1 Price Dispersion and the Costs of Inﬂation
Here we discuss the eﬀects of inﬂation on the dispersion of prices due to ﬁrms’ behaviour
discussed above, and the implications for total employment. These dispersion eﬀects will
lead to costs of inﬂation, as we shall see later.
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tDt−1 + (1 − ξ)Q
−ζ
t (39)
4.2 The Ramsey Problem
For simplicity, we ignore government spending, so that Yt = Ct. As a consequence of the
price diversion result above, the deterministic Ramsey problem for a policy maker (with




















subject to the constraints (39) and
Zt = hCYt−1 1 = ξΠ
ζ−1
t + (1 − ξ)Q
1−ζ
t QtHt = Λt (41)
Ht − ξβ[Π
ζ−1













Note that the dynamics of the term D
φ
t contains only second-order terms, and therefore
satisﬁes Theorem 2. Then had we included an optimal subsidy rate, we would have been
able to expand the utility function about the eﬃcient rate.
We can now write the Lagrangian for the policymaker’s optimal control problem as
follows:
L = Ω0 +
∞  
t=0
βt[λ1t(Zt+1 − hCYt) + λ2t(1 − ξΠ
ζ−1
t − (1 − ξ)Q
1−ζ
t )
+ λ3t(QtHt − Λt) + λ4t(Ht − ξβΠ
ζ−1
t+1Ht+1 − Yt(Yt − Zt)−σ)












+ λ6t(Dt − ξΠ
ζ
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First-order conditions are given by:





















t − λ4t((Yt − Zt)−σ − σYt(Yt − Zt)−σ−1) = 0
−(Yt − Zt)−σ +
1
β
λ1t−1 − λ4tσYt(Yt − Zt)−σ−1 = 0
β(1 − ζ)ξλ2,t+1Π
ζ−2







−λ2t(1 − ξ)(1 − ζ)Q
−ζ
t + λ3tHt + ζ(1 − ξ)λ6tQ
−ζ−1
t = 0
λ3tQt + λ4t − ξΠζ−1λ4,t−1 = 0





















t λ5t = 0
There are also boundary conditions: initial values of the backward-looking variables,
and λ40 = λ50 = 0, since Ht and Λt are forward-looking, plus a terminal condition.
A suﬃcient terminal condition is that the dynamic system described by the ﬁrst-order
conditions and original constraints is saddle-path stable. In fact all that concerns us for
LQ approximation is the steady state and the requirement of saddle-path stability. By
standard control theory the latter is ensured if the discount factor β is suﬃciently close
to unity. The zero-inﬂation10 equilibrium values are given by
Π = Q = 1 Λ = H =
Y 1−σ(1 − hC)−σ
1 − βξ






1 − βhC − α
σ(1−hCβ)
1−hC + φ





Y 1−σ(1 − hC)−σ
1 − βξ
( ασ




Now that we have the steady-state values of the Lagrange multipliers, we are in a position
to apply Theorem 1. We ﬁrst linearize the relationships between the variables, and then
obtain the quadratic approximation of the Lagrangian.
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We linearize about a zero-inﬂation steady state and later examine the second-order condi-
tions for this to be appropriate for our LQ approximation. Deﬁne ht,λt,qt,πt as deviations
of Ht,Λt,Qt,Πt from their steady state values. In addition deﬁne yt = (Yt − Y )/Y ≈
logYt/Y , at = (At − A)/A and deﬁne zt = (Zt − Z)/Y .
Linearization of the constraints yields
Hqt = λt − ht ξπt = (1 − ξ)qt (48)
zt+1 = hCyt (49)
ht − βξ(ζ − 1)Hπt+1 − βξht+1 = Y 1−σ(1 − hC)−σ(yt −
σ
1 − hC
(yt − zt)) (50)




A1+φ(yt − at) (51)
Now subtract (50) from (51). Noting that Λ = H, and substituting from (48) yields a
Phillips curve relationship of the form:
πt = βπt+1 +





(yt − zt) − (1 + φ)at) (52)
Note that linearization of the dispersion term around zero inﬂation is irrelevant, since it
reduces to dt − ξdt−1 = 0.11 Also note that at can be a stochastic process turning the
optimization problem into one that is stochastic.
4.4 The Accurate LQ Approximation
At this point we apply the result of Section 2, in order to obtain a quadratic approximation
to the period t value of the Hamiltonian. Ignoring the steady state value of the latter, the






















(1 + φ)2Y 1+φ
A1+φytat
−λ5σY 2(Y − Z)−σ−1(yt − zt)yt +
1
2





t((ζ − 1)(ζ − 2)λ2Πζ−3 + (ζ − 1)(ζ − 2)Πζ−3Hλ4 + ζλ5(ζ − 1)Πζ−2Λ





t(λ2(1 − ξ)(1 − ζ)ζQ−1−ζ + λ6(1 − ξ)(1 + ζ)ζQ−2−ζ) + qthtλ3 (53)
11As Kim et al. (2006a) show, this feature follows from the particular choice of variables with respect to
which we applied the Taylor series approximation. If we had chosen a diﬀerent normalization and linearized
with respect to
 
logDt/D instead, we would have a bifurcation problem.
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ﬁnally arrive at the correct quadratic approximation to the non-linear Ramsey problem as













(yt − hCyt−1)2 + φ(α + λ5(1 + φ))y2
t






(1 − hC)2(yt − hCyt−1)2 +
ξζ
(1 − ξ)(1 − βξ)




4.5 Summary of the General Procedure
We summarize the general Hamiltonian procedure by providing the following step-by-step
recipe the practitioner should follow12:
1. Set out the deterministic non-linear problem for the Ramsey Problem, to maximize
the representative agents utility subject to non-linear dynamic constraints.
2. Write down the Lagrangian for the problem.
3. Calculate the ﬁrst order conditions. We do not require the initial conditions for an
optimum since we ultimately only need the steady-state of the Ramsey problem.
4. Calculate the steady state of the ﬁrst-order conditions. The terminal condition
implied by this procedure is that the system converges to this steady state.
5. Calculate a second-order Taylor series approximation, about the steady state, of the
Hamiltonian associated with the Lagrangian in 2.
6. Calculate a ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation, about the steady state, of the
ﬁrst-order conditions and the original constraints.
7. Use 4. to eliminate the steady-state Lagrangian multipliers in 5. By appropriate
elimination both the Hamiltonian and the constraints can be expressed in minimal
form. This then gives us the accurate LQ approximation of the original non-linear
optimization problem in the form of a minimal linear state-space representation of
the constraints and a quadratic form of the utility expressed in terms of the states.
12MATLAB software to implement this procedure is available on request from the authors.
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The Social Planner can be regarded as maximizing (24) viewing all agents as identical,
and so can set Cit = Ct,Nit = Nt, subject to the constraint Ct = Yt = AtNt. The social
planner chooses a trajectory for output which satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition








The eﬃcient steady-state level of output Yt+1 = Yt = Yt−1 = Y ∗, say, is therefore given by
(Y ∗)φ+σ =
(1 − hCβ)A1+φ
κ(1 − hC)σ (56)
We can now examine the ineﬃciency of the zero-inﬂation steady state. From (45) the
zero-inﬂation steady state output in the Ramsey problem is given by Y = ¯ Y where









κ(1 − hC)σ (57)
It is easy to check that this is exactly the same steady-state level as that of the ﬂexi-price
economy where ﬁrms set prices optimally at every period. Comparing (56) and (57) we
have the result ﬁrst obtained by Choudhary and Levine (2006):
Result 1











< 1 − hCβ (58)
In the case where there is no habit persistence in consumption, hC = 0, then (58)
always holds. In this case market power in the output and labour markets captured by
the elasticities η,ζ respectively drive the natural rate of output below the eﬃcient level.
If habit persistence in consumption is suﬃciently high, then (58) does not hold and the
natural rate of output and employment are then too high compared with the eﬃcient
outcome and people are working too much. Why is this? In the eﬃcient case, there is an
incentive for the social planner to raise Ct relative to hCCt−1, but also a disincentive to raise
Ct because of its eﬀect on welfare in the next period. For decentralized consumers, there is
no disincentive eﬀect because each will ignore the eﬀect of its current raised consumption
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of mark-ups over marginal costs in the output and labour markets respectively. A plausible









1.22. A condition on hC
for (58) to hold is therefore hCβ < 0.306. Most empirical estimates of habit in a quarterly
model are in the range hC = [0.5,0.9] which would see this condition not holding.13
4.7 The Eﬃcient Case
For this particular example, we are able to illustrate Theorem 4 without needing directly to
invoke a tax/subsidy and add a further algebraic burden. Suppose instead that the eﬀect
of habit is to directly oﬀset the eﬀect of the distortions due to η,ζ i.e. 1−α−βhC = 0, so
that the value of output in the Ramsey problem (assuming zero inﬂation) is equal to the
eﬃcient level. We need to check that the suﬃcient condition on ˜ V of Theorem 4 holds in
this case. One can see by inspection, that to ﬁrst order about the eﬃcient level of output
and zero inﬂation, we have the following expansion:
∞  
t=0




















But to ﬁrst order, it is easy to see that dt = ξdt−1, so starting at d0 = 0, it is clear that
to ﬁrst order, the value of (59) is zero.
It is now of interest to verify that expansion to second order in this case yields the same
expansion as for the large distortions case. We ﬁrst note that the second order expansion
of Dt is given by







from which it follows that in a second order expansion we can ignore d2
t. Furthermore,












































We now need to compare this with the expansion in the large distortions case, given by
(54). Using (56) in (61), and using the fact that λ5 = 0 (because 1−α−βhC = 0) in (54)
for this case, it is easy to show that the quadratic expansions are identical.










< 1−hCβ which suggests
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The small distortion case assumes that the zero-inﬂation steady state about which we
have linearized is approximately eﬃcient. From result 2 this implies that 1 − βhC − α
is small. We are now in a position to examine the nature of this ‘approximation to an
approximation’ by examining the correctly quadratiﬁed single-period utility (54). From
(46) we can see that this means that λ5 must be small. An examination of (54) reveals
that the small distortion case, which would omit all terms involving λ5, is valid only if
| λ5(1 + φ) |<< α or, using the deﬁnition of λ5, only if
(1 + φ)




Typical estimated parameter values are σ = 3 (with this value or higher being conﬁrmed
within other contexts as well), φ = 1.3. With hC at the mid-point of the range of estimates
at hC = 0.7 this gives the left-hand-side of (62) as 0.22 and the right-hand side as 0.69.
Neglected terms are therefore of the order of one third of those retained.
5 Target Implementability and External Habit
Svensson (2003, 2005) suggests real-world monetary policy is best viewed in terms of a
“prescribed guide for monetary policy”. These would include “targeting rules” and “in-
strument rules”. The latter could consist of Taylor-type that prescribe the commitment
of the monetary authority to change the nominal interest rate in response to changes in
target macro-economic variables such as the output gap and past, current or expected fu-
ture inﬂation rates. However on both normative and positive grounds he strongly argues
for the former.14 A general targeting rules would specify the objectives to be achieved
by for example setting out target variables, their targets and a loss function to be mini-
mized. In the context of our quadratic approximations we can interpret these targets as
‘bliss points’, provided that the period t quadratic approximation achieves a maximum at
these. This leads to a particular form of targeting rule in the Svensson sense that we call
‘target-implementability’:
Deﬁnition: A period-t welfare function is target-implementable iﬀ, in the vicinity
of the steady state of the ﬁrst-order conditions for a maximum, it can be written as a
weighted sum of squares of linear terms, with all weights negative; that is a sum of the
squares of deviations of target variables from their bliss points.
14This paper does not engage with the targeting versus instrument rules debate (but see, for example,
McCallum and Nelson (2004)).
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written as Q = XΛX′ where X is a matrix of eigenvectors and Λ is a diagonal matrix of
real positive eigenvalues we now have:
Result 2
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the solution to the Ramsey problem to be target-
implementable is that, in the vicinity of the steady state of the ﬁrst-order conditions for
a maximum, the quadratic approximation to the Lagrangian is negative semi-deﬁnite.
Now consider the target-implementability of the welfare function in our LQ approxi-
mation to the Ramsey problem. First consider the case without habit (hC = 0). After
some further eﬀort (and subtracting an appropriate term in a2
t), (54) then reduces to
−κY φ+1












This is clearly target-implementable with a stochastic output target
1+φ
σ+φat and inﬂation
target of zero (the steady state about which we have formed the LQ approximation).
Since from Theorem 3 and result 2, the condition for target-implementability is a suﬃcient
condition for the ﬁrst-order conditions to deﬁne a local maximum, we can now also conﬁrm
that the zero inﬂation steady state (that we found to satisfy these ﬁrst-order conditions
for hC ≥ 0) is indeed appropriate. Our stochastic target is of course the ﬂexi-price output
so that (63) turns out to be micro-founded loss function popularized by Woodford (2003)
that penalizes deviations of the output gap and inﬂation from zero.
Now consider the case hC > 0. As for hC = 0 we now need to demonstrate whether the
natural rate as calculated, with zero inﬂation, is actually the steady state for the Ramsey
problem. To check this, we need either to solve the corresponding Riccati equation or to
check the suﬃcient conditions of target-implementability. If the suﬃcient conditions of
the latter are not satisﬁed, then checking the steady state Riccati matrix will not yield
analytic results. This is because the equation governing it is highly nonlinear, and in
addition the matrix is of dimension 2, so analytic solutions will not in general be found.
We therefore focus on target-implementability, and determine what conditions on the
underlying parameters are required for (54) to be negative semi-deﬁnite. By inspecting
this approximation we can see that apart from completing the square for the disturbance
term at, it will be negative semi-deﬁnite provided that the terms in yt and (yt − zt) are
negative semi-deﬁnite. This is equivalent to the requirement that we can write these terms
as a weighted sum of y2
t and (yt − νzt)2, for some ν.
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a value of the order of 0.99. It turns out that even then, the conditions for target-
implementability are rather messy, so instead we focus on a set of empirically innocuous
suﬃcient conditions on the parameters.
Proposition
(i) When (58) does not hold so that the natural rate is above the eﬃcient rate, suﬃ-
cient conditions for the Ramsey problem with habit in consumption to have a target-
implementable zero inﬂation steady state are that σ > 1 and φσ2 > φ + σ.
(ii) When (58) holds so that the natural rate is below the eﬃcient rate, suﬃcient condi-
tions for the zero-inﬂation steady state to be target-implementable are that α(1 + σ) >
(1 − hC)(1 − φ) and φ3 > φ + σ.
Proof: See Appendix B.
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t − 2(1 + φ)(α + λ5(1 + φ))ytat
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ξζ
(1 − ξ)(1 − βξ)








(1 − hC)2 a2 = λ5
σ
1 − hC
a3 = φ(α + λ5(1 + φ)) (64)
with a1 > 0, a3 −
a2
2
a1 > 0. Thus at each period there is a bliss-point for inﬂation of
0, a bliss-point for output of (1 + φ)(α + λ5(1 + φ))/(a3 −
a2
2
a1)at, and a bliss-point for











  yt−1.15 In
the special case hC = 0, there is no bliss-point for output growth, the coeﬃcient on y2
t is
a1 + 2a2 + a3, so that the bliss-point for output is
1+φ
σ+φat as in (63).
Using typical estimated parameter values discussed above, both of the suﬃcient con-
ditions (i) and (ii) are easily satisﬁed. Necessary conditions are much more diﬃcult to
derive, as there is a wide range of parameter values for which the suﬃcient conditions of
Theorem 3 are satisﬁed, even though the quadratic approximation is not negative deﬁnite.
The following set of theoretically possible parameters however, yields a situation where the
necessary ﬁrst-order conditions yield a zero-inﬂation steady state, but there is no steady-
state for the Riccati matrix: σ < 0.6, φ = 0.03, hC = 0.75, ξ = 0.7 and ζ = 5, η = 16
(implying α = 0.75). Furthermore, the suﬃcient conditions of Theorem 3 are violated for
some values of t. Thus we have the following:
15Note that a2 ≥ 0 iﬀ λ5 ≥ 0. λ5 = 0 for the eﬃcient case; λ5 > 0 if hC is small and λ5 < 0 as hC → 1.
31
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 759 
June 2007
In order to reduce the algebraic burden for checking target-implementability, we makeResult 3: For the problem with habit, there are possible conﬁgurations of parameter
values such that the solution to the Ramsey problem does not have a zero inﬂation steady-
state equilibrium.
Although σ < 0.6 lies outside most, but not all estimates, this example is interesting
because it serves as an example of why second-order conditions, routinely by-passed in
the optimal dynamic policy literature, do matter. Benigno and Benigno (2006) discuss
a case where randomized policy may be superior in a non-inﬂationary steady state. The
conditions they derive for this correspond precisely to those which guarantee that the
steady-state solution to the corresponding Riccati equation is either negative deﬁnite, or
in which the negative deﬁnite solution is unstable. Only by implication do they suggest
that the zero-inﬂation optimal solution must therefore be completely invalid.
6 Nash Equilibria in a Two-Bloc Model
We now investigate a two bloc version of our previous model without habit in consumption
as in Clarida et al. (2002), and focus on the use of the subsidy approach which enables the
decentralized level of output to match the eﬃcient level. For this case we abstract from
productivity shocks and schoose units so that the production functions are Y = N,Y ∗ =
N∗ for the home and foreign blocks respectively. Thus we can regard the level of output
in each bloc as the resource.
The two blocs are of diﬀerent sizes, in the ratio (1 − γ) : γ. Consumption preferences
are Cobb-Douglas, and once we take the risk-sharing relationship into account, this results
in terms-of-trade being equal to relative output.
6.1 Non-cooperative Social Planners’ Problem
As for the single policymaker case we only need to consider the deterministic optimization
problem. From the viewpoint of the social planner in each country, each has to solve the
following problems:






s.t. C = kY 1−γY ∗γ (65)






s.t. C∗ = kY 1−γY ∗γ (66)
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¯ Y
σ+φ















By analogy with the single country case, we regard these levels of output as the eﬃcient
levels under non-cooperation.
6.2 Choice of Subsidy to Match the Eﬃcient Level
Consider now the decentralized equilibrium, with ﬂexible prices and wages. The home
planner maximizes (65), and the foreign planner maximizes (66) with respect to the subsidy
rates τ,τ∗ subject to the competitive choice of wages and prices. By analogy with the single
country case we may write down the following ﬁrst-order conditions for the latter:
W
P
= 1/(1 − 1/η)NφCσ W∗
P∗ = (1 − 1/η)N∗φC∗σ










where the terms of trade S = Y/Y ∗.
The home policymaker maximizes (65) subject to all the constraints. The eﬀective
mathematics of this is that each policymaker chooses Y , Y ∗ in the same way as did the
social planner above, and then sets the tax rates to achieve this. This yields the Clarida
et al. (2002) result:
(1 − 1/η)(1 − 1/ζ) = (1 − τ)(1 − γ) = (1 − τ∗)γ (69)
6.3 LQ Approximation for the Small Distortions Case
Here we assume as before that there is inertia in the decision-making of ﬁrms, so that
there is a price dispersion eﬀect on utility. As a consequence, we may write the utility
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1 = ξΠ
ζ−1
t + (1 − ξ)Q
1−ζ





















tDt−1 + (1 − ξ)Q
−ζ
t (72)
Note the diﬀerence between these equations and (32)-(35). The optimal price P0
H is set
in the home currency, so that Q is deﬁned as P0
H/PH, but this means that there is a
multiplicative term PH/P to be accounted for. The latter depends on the terms of trade,
which explains the presence of the term (Y ∗/Y )γ. Note too, that Π refers to home producer
price inﬂation, not consumer price inﬂation. In a similar manner, the constraints associated
with the foreign country’s price-setting are given by
1 = ξΠ
∗ζ−1

































t−1 + (1 − ξ)Q
∗−ζ
t (73)
Suppose now that the tax rates are set so as to achieve the social planners’ eﬃcient levels
of output when inﬂation is equal to zero. We can now expand (omitting the second order
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(1 − γ)[(γ + φ + (1 − γ)σ)y2
t] + 2γ(1 − γ)(σ − 1)yty∗






























(1 − γ)[(γ + φ + (1 − γ)σ)y2
t] + 2γ(1 − γ)(σ − 1)yty∗




This result is striking; the use of the tax rate to shift the system to the eﬃcient rate
eliminates the ﬁrst-order term in yt, but does not eliminate the term in y∗
t. The converse
is of course true for the foreign LQ approximation. This would be ﬁne if we were searching
for a Nash equilibrium in output deviations. In this case for the home country, the terms in
y∗, y∗2 can be ignored, as they are under the control of the foreign policymaker. However,
if we are searching for a Nash equilibrium in inﬂation π, π∗, then the latter terms cannot
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(72), so that the term in y∗ now matters for optimal policy for the home policymaker.
But this violates the requirement that that an appropriate LQ approximation is purely
quadratic in the utility function. We therefore have the following result:
Theorem 5
The small distortions LQ approximation is inappropriate as an approximation to the Nash
monetary policy equilibrium when inﬂation is taken as the instrument.
Whether inﬂation or the output gap is the proxy for interest rates is rarely made clear
in most of the theoretical analysis of monetary policy based on micro-foundations. Even
if we do go along with the output gap as the instrument, (74) still represents a deviation
from Clarida et al. (2002), who conclude that the welfare approximation for the home
country only involves home variables. It is clear from (74) that even if we can exclude the
y∗
t, y∗2
t terms from the home country’s decision-making process, there is still a term in
yty∗
t to account for.
6.4 LQ Approximation for the Large Distortions Case
We now apply the Hamiltonian approach to obtain an LQ Approximation that is not
subject to the problems of the previous section. Before doing so, we need to carefully
choose the appropriate solution concept for the equilibrium of the noncooperative game.
Firstly there is the issue of which instrument to use16 ; here we have the choice of the
inﬂation rate or the output gap, each one acting as a proxy for the true instrument,
which is the interest rate. We choose the inﬂation rate, following Benigno and Benigno
(2006). Secondly, there is the choice of equilibrium concept given the instrument, which
we choose to be open-loop Nash. This means that the home country chooses its inﬂation
rate subject to the set of future inﬂation rates chosen by the foreign country. This is
ideally suited to obtaining an LQ approximation using the Hamiltonian approach, but it
is not the only Nash solution. The alternative is closed-loop Nash, for which the sequence
of foreign inﬂation rates is known to be dependent on the other system variables, such as
output, and this is taken into account by the home policymaker when setting its inﬂation
rate. However the latter concept has a solution that can only be obtained numerically
even in the LQ case and, as far as we are aware, has not been characterized for non-linear
problems. For reasons of tractability therefore, we therefore utilize the open-loop Nash
16This was not an issue for the single policymaker, but does arise in non-cooperative games, as the
well-known Bertrand versus Cournot Nash equilibria in the oligopoly game clearly illustrates.
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concept.The problem for the home country then can be described as one of ﬁnding the station-
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with respect to all variables other than Π∗
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= −λ1t(1 − ξ)(1 − ζ)Q
−ζ














































= (1 − ζ)ξλ1tΠ
ζ−2
t − λ3tξ(ζ − 1)Π
ζ−2
t Ht − λ4tξζΠ
ζ−1
t Λt − ξζλ5tΠ
ζ−1
t Dt−1 = 0
The steady state is given by
Π = Q = D = 1 = Π∗ = Q∗ = D∗ Λ = H =
Y 1+φ
kα(1 − βξ)
= Λ∗ = H∗
Y σ+φ = αk1−σ = Y ∗σ+φ
36
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 759 
June 2007(1 − γ − α)k = (λ3 + λ∗
3)(1 − σ)(1 − γ) − λ3(1 + φ) γk = (λ3 + λ∗
3)(1 − σ)γ − λ∗
3(1 + φ)
Y 1+φ(1 − λ3
φ
kα
) = (1 − βξ)λ5 −Y 1+φλ∗
3
φ
kα = (1 − βξ)λ∗
5
−λ1(1 − ξ)(1 − ζ) + λ2H + λ5ζ(1 − ξ) = 0 −λ∗
1(1 − ξ)(1 − ζ) + λ∗
2H∗ + λ∗
5ζ(1 − ξ) = 0
λ4 = −λ3 λ∗
4 = −λ∗
3 λ2 = −λ3(1 − ξ) λ∗
2 = −λ∗
3(1 − ξ)
We can now expand (76) about its steady state in order to evaluate the second-order
approximation in the welfare, using the steady state values of the Lagrange multipliers
λ1, ..., λ∗
5. Deﬁning yt = (Yt − Y )/Y, πt = Πt − 1, y∗
t = (Y ∗
t − Y )/Y, π∗
t = Π∗
t − 1, we
ﬁrst note that it is easy to show that ∂L/∂Π∗ = 0, so that the coeﬃcient of π∗
t is zero.




φ + 1 − α + ασ
σ + φ
 
(σ + φ)((1 − γ)yt + γy∗










For further details see Appendix C. The ﬁrst term in this expression represents consump-
tion deviations and the second, terms of trade deviations. The presence of foreign country
inﬂation deviations arises from the fact that they are associated with foreign country price
dispersion. The latter enters the foreign price-setting decision, which in turn has an impact
on the home country’s consumption choice.
What is immediately noticeable in (77) is the symmetry with which the terms in output
and inﬂation deviations from each bloc enter the quadratic approximation to the utility
of the home bloc. It implies of course that it is identical to the approximation to the
utility of the foreign bloc. Furthermore, a similar calculation for the cooperative utility
function produces an identical approximation. Thus we are able to replicate the Benigno
and Benigno (2006) result in the absence of shocks, that for identical economies when the
system starts out of equilibrium, there are no gains from cooperation.
In the presence of shocks, the structure of the welfare approximation would be identical
to (77) apart from there now being output deviation targets that would depend on the
shocks. These are obtained via calculation of the second derivative terms ∂2L/∂Y ∂S,
where S represents a shock. As in Benigno and Benigno (2006), for some shocks the
output targets are diﬀerent under cooperation and non-cooperation, so that there are
potential gains from cooperation even for identical economies.
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Despite recent advances in numerical methods for non-linear optimization problems, the
‘curse of dimensionality’ (see Judd (1998), chapter 7) will ensure the usefulness of LQ
approximations to these problem, even for the case of a single policy-maker. For games
involving many policy-makers a LQ approximation to calculations of players is for some
equilibrium concepts, for example the closed-loop Nash equilibrium, probably essential.
This paper has attempted a ‘users’ guide’ to accurate LQ approximation for researchers
studying such problems. We have highlighted pitfalls already exposed in the literature
and added another one in emphasizing that second-order conditions, usually ignored in
the optimal policy literature, do matter.
The Hamiltonian method of Magill (1977), which we have shown is equivalent to the
Benigno-Woodford ‘large distortions’ procedure, provides an accurate LQ approximation
of the household’s utility function given a linearized model economy in the vicinity of the
Ramsey commitment problem for the policymaker. For the case of non-cooperative games,
the latter is the Ramsey problem for each policy-maker given the open-loop trajectory of
instruments of the other players. The question then is, given the choice of welfare which
diﬀers for cooperative and non-cooperative games, is this LQ approximation appropriate
for other types of policy (for example for optimized simple rules, time-consistent policy
or for other non-cooperative equilibrium concepts)? Because the Ramsey commitment
problem is, ex ante, the best the policymaker can achieve, as Woodford (2003), chapter 6,
has pointed out, this is indeed the case.17 Thus LQ approximation provides a tractable
framework for comparing both cooperative and non-cooperative rules with and without
commitment, and diﬀerent forms of non-cooperative equilibria (closed-loop versus open-
loop, diﬀerent choices of instruments) using the same LQ approximation of the problem
facing each policymaker. Future research involving the authors will pursue precisely this
agenda.
One ﬁnal caveat is in order. Whereas the thrust of this paper has been to provide a
basis for comparing the fully optimal rule to any other rule, Benigno and Woodford (2006)
have focused on the timeless perspective, which requires a diﬀerent initial condition for
the fully optimal policy. They have noted that in order to ensure that this achieves the
highest welfare compared to any other rule, a correction needs to be made to the latter.
This correction involves a second-order approximation to the evolution of the system under
the policy rule in question, and therefore goes beyond the scope of this paper.
17He writes that “... this calculation (of the quadratic approximation) need only be done once, and not
separately for each type of policy that one may wish to study”.
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nian Procedures
A.1 The Benigno-Woodford Procedure
To ﬁnd (¯ π, ¯ x) and h ﬁrst write
(xt − x∗)2 + π2
t ≡ (xt − ¯ x + ¯ x − x∗)2 + (πt − ¯ π + ¯ π)2
= (xt − ¯ x)2 + 2(xt − ¯ x)(¯ x − x∗) + (πt − ¯ π)2 + 2¯ π(πt − ¯ π)
+ constant terms (A.1)
Then (12) holds iﬀ at each time t





(πt − ¯ π) − (πt − ¯ π) − a(xt − ¯ x) + b(xt − ¯ x)2
 
(A.2)
Equating quadratic and linear terms we arrive at
θ = 1 + hb (A.3)
φ = 1 (A.4)
2(¯ x − x∗) − ha = 0 (A.5)







Then together with the condition for (¯ π, ¯ x) to be a steady state:
(β − 1)¯ π − f(¯ x) = 0 (A.7)
we have 5 equations to solve to θ, φ, h, ¯ π and ¯ x. The solution is
h = −
2(x∗ − ¯ x)
a









> 0 iﬀ β > λ and x∗ > ¯ x (A.9)
θ = 1 + hb < 1 if x∗ > ¯ x (A.10)







(x∗ − ¯ x)
a
+ f(¯ x) = 0 (A.11)
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We now show that the LQ procedure of BW is equivalent to a rather simpler one. Consider











πt = βπt+1 + f(xt) (A.13)





(xt − x∗)2 + π2
t + µt(βπt+1 − πt + f(xt))
 
(A.14)
with respect to {πt}, {xt} and the Lagrangian multiplier {µt}. This is the deterministic
component of our original non-linear optimization problem available to the policymaker if
she can commit. The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are
2(xt − x∗) + µtf′(xt) = 0 (A.15)
2πt − µt +
β
λ
µt−1 = 0 (A.16)
πt − βπt+1 − f(xt) = 0 (A.17)
This system has a steady state (x,π,µ) at








(1 − β)π − f(x) = 0 (A.20)
Comparing (A.18) to (A.20) with (A.7) to (A.9) and noting that a = f′(¯ x) in (A.5) it
is immediately apparent that (x,π,µ) = (¯ x, ¯ π,h) found in the BW procedure. Then the
modiﬁed loss function (12) is a second-order Taylor series approximation to the Lagrangian
(A.14) evaluated at the steady state of the optimal commitment solution in the vicinity
of (x,π,µ).
B Proof of Proposition
(i) Firstly, we require the coeﬃcient of π2
t inside the brackets of (54), α + (1 + φ)λ5,
to be positive. A little calculation shows that (with α > 1 − hC) this term is greater
than 1 − hC provided that σ > 1. Ignoring the shock term at, if we now consider the
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be positive provided that (a) α + (1 + φ)λ5 > 0, (b) σ
1−hC(1 −
λ5(1+σ)
1−hC ) > 0 and (c)






(1−hC)2 > 0. (a) has already been shown, and since
by assumption α > 1 − hC it follows that λ5 < 0, so the left hand side of (b) is greater 0.
After some manipulation we can show that after multiplying (c) through by (1−hC)2 the
left hand side becomes
(φ3 − φ − σ)(1 − hC)2 + 2α(1 − hC)(σφ2 + φ + σ) + (φσ2 − φ − σ)α2
> (φ3 + σφ2)(1 − hC)2 + α(1 − hC)(σφ2 + φ + σ) + (φσ2 − φ − σ)α2 (B.21)
where the inequality holds when α > 1−hC. Thus the suﬃcient condition φσ2−φ−σ > 0
is likely to be considerably more stringent a condition than is required.
(ii) With α < 1 − hC, it is clear that λ5 > 0, so that (a) above is satisﬁed. After a
little manipulation, it is easy to show that σ
1−hC(1 −
λ5(1+σ)
1−hC ) = σ
(1−hC)2(σ+φ)(α(1 + σ) −
(1 − hC)(1 − φ)), so that (b) is satisﬁed if α(1 + σ) > (1 − hC)(1 − φ). Finally, using the
condition α < 1 − hC,
(φ3 − φ − σ)(1 − hC)2 + 2α(1 − hC)(σφ2 + φ + σ) + (φσ2 − φ − σ)α2
> (φ3 − σ − φ)(1 − hC)2 + α(1 − hC)(σφ2 + φ + σ) + (φσ2 + σφ2)α2 (B.22)
where the inequality holds when α < 1−hC. Once again the suﬃcient condition φ3−φ−σ >
0 is likely to be considerably more stringent a condition than is required.
C Derivation of Second-Order Welfare Approximation in
the Two-Bloc Case:
From now on, we drop all t-subscripts for purposes of conciseness. Firstly, we note that
∂L
∂Π∗ = −ξ(ζ − 1)Π∗ζ−1λ∗




which is easily shown to equal 0. Next, the coeﬃcient of 1
2y2


















φ + 1 − α + ασ
φ + σ
(1 − γ)(φ + σ − σγ + γ)
(C.24)
that of yty∗
t is given by
Y Y ∗ ∂2L
∂Y ∂Y ∗ =
Y 1+φ
α








φ + 1 − α + ασ
φ + σ
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φ + 1 − α + ασ
φ + σ
γ(φ + γσ + 1 − γ)
(C.26)
Summing these yields the ﬁrst two terms in (77), expressed as deviations in total output
and the terms of trade. The second-order terms in π2











t[(ζ − 2)λ1 + (ζ − 2)λ3H + ζλ4H + ζλ5] − πthtξ(ζ − 1)λ3




t(1 − ξ)ζ[(1 − ζ)λ1 − (ζ + 1)λ5]
(C.27)
where ht = Ht − H,λt = Λt − Λ,q = Qt − 1. Substituting ht + Hqt = λt, ξπt = (1 − ξ)qt
yields the required term of (77). The coeﬃcient of 1
2π∗2
t is given by
∂2L
∂Π∗2 = −ξ(ζ − 1)[(ζ − 2)λ∗




Finally, it is easy to show that all partial second derivatives ∂2L/∂Πi∂Y i = 0 (where Πi =
Π,Π∗, Y i = Y,Y ∗), so that there are no cross-terms of the form πtyt in the approximation.
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